File Name: population growth and development in africa .zip
Strengthening the home-to-facility continuum of newborn and child health care through mHealth: Evidence from an intervention in rural Malawi Jean Christophe Fotso,Linda Vesel,Zachariah Jezman. Background: The consequences of rapid population growth for development and policy options for addressing undesirable population trends remain at the core of demographic enquiry in developed and developing countries. In this paper, we re-examine the data on the particular relationship between population trends in sub-Saharan Africa and economic growth and development.
Not a MyNAP member yet? Register for a free account to start saving and receiving special member only perks. Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Conclusion We have examined a diverse set of mechanisms through which population growth affects economic development.
This chapter opens with a review and synthesis of our conclusions on the expected effects of a decline in the population grown rate that works through these mechanisms.
It then proceeds to a discussion of how environmental and institutional contexts mediate the actions of these mechanisms a major theme of this report. The final section discusses policy implications. As noted above, such a decline would produce at every subsequent point slower population growth, smaller population size, lower population density, and an older age structure.
Working through these direct demographic effects, a reduced level of fertility is also likely to produce several other changes. Slower Population Growth and Exhaustible Resources Globally slower population growth may delay the time at which a particular stage of depletion of an exhaustible resource is reached. This effect does not necessarily increase the number of people who will have access to But it is important to recognize that no single exhaustible resource is essential or irreplaceable; it is valued for its economic contribution, not for its own sake.
As easily accessible reserves of natural resources are exhausted, the real cost of extraction, and hence the resource pace, rises.
This price rise should stimulate the search for alternative materials. Historically, these adaptive strategies have been extremely successful. To the extent that slower population growth results in a slower rate of resource depletion, these adaptive strategies will also occur more slowly. Hence, it seems unlikely that slower population growth will allow a larger number of people, over future generations, to enjoy a given standard of living thanks to lower natural resource prices.
Slower Population Growth and Renewable Resources Slower population growth, in some cases nationally and in others globally, is likely to lead to a reduced rate of degradation of renewable common- property resources such as air, water, and species of plants and animals. If significant amounts of land and forest resources are held in common in a country, they will also tend to be degraded less rapidly.
These effects are likely to be more evident in the short run-in say, a decade or two. In the long run, population growth itself might create greater incentives to develop the social and political institutions necessary for conservation.
Such incentives are irrelevant, of course, if the resource has become depleted beyond the point of restoration. Moreover, changes are costly and the need to bear such costs is itself a consequence of population growth.
Slower Population Growth, Health, and Education Lower fertility is likely to raise average per child levels of household expenditure on health and education and thereby improve levels of child health and education. By themselves, such changes should result in a more productive labor force. Superimposed on these within-family effects is the possibility that lower fertility will alter the distribution of children among families by income class.
If fertility declines are largest among high- income families, average levels of schooling and health among children could actually decrease despite an absolute improvement in measures of well-being among poor families.
But if family planning programs result in larger fertilibr reductions among poorer families, the within-family gains will be accentuated at the societal level. Slower population growth is likely to raise public expenditures on schooling per school-aged child.
Evidence from the educational literature suggests that. We do not find convincing evidence that lower fertility will result in faster growth in enrollment ratios apart from within-family effects. Slower Population Growth and Income Unless a fertility decline is concentrated among high-income families, it is likely to lead to a reduction in income disparities among social classes. This is primarily a long-term effect although a variety of short-tenn effects are also possible and wows primarily by raising payments to labor relative to payments to capital and raising payments to unskilled labor relative to skilled labor.
We have found little evidence that the aggregate savings rate depends on growth rates or the age structure of a population. Assuming that the savings rate remains unchanged, a fertility decline will lead to an increase in the ratio of capital to labor and, along with it, labor productivity, wages, and per capita income.
The increase in the capitalllabor ratio will reduce rates of ran to capital and reduce payments to owners of capital. In the short run, more land per agricultural worker is likely to raise labor productivity in agriculture. Long-term effects may differ because of changes in the organization and techniques of production that are induced by the relative change in factor availability. These effects may reduce the short- term gains of slower growth.
Slower Population Growth and Cities Win slower population growth, cities grow more slowly, both in the short and long run. A reduced rate of urban labor force grown in developing countries most of which is a product of natural increase among the urban population is not likely to be systematically accompanied by corresponding reductions in joblessness.
However, it may increase He proportion of He urban labor force working in high-wage jobs in the modern sector of the economy and reduce He proportion working in the low-wage, infonnal sector. Environmental and climatic conditions clearly shape the local impact of population growth. In countries such as Bangladesh, where ratios of agricultural labor to arable land are already very high, there is a presumptive case that labor productivity in agriculture will decline more rapidly with added labor than if ratios were low.
Nonagricultural production possibilities, and the opportunities for trade, also affect the importance of these natural features. Important as these natural features may be in conditioning the economic response to population growth, Hey appear to be far less important than conditions created by people.
Many of the initial effects of population growth are negative, but they can be ameliorated or even reversed in the long run if institutional adjustment mechanisms are in place. Among the most important of such mechanisms are property rights in land and properly functioning markets for labor, capital, and goods. Such markets permit the initial effects of population growth to be registered in the fonn of price changes, which can trigger a variety of adjustments, including the introduction of other factors of production that have become more valuable as a result of the increase in population; a search for substitutes for increasingly scarce factors of production; intensified research to find production processes better suited to the new conditions; reallocation of resources toward sectors e.
Of course, these adjustments may entail real costs, even when these are minimized by efficient institutions. When markets function very poorly, or do not exist, adjustments to population change are likely to be slower or to not occur at all. These are not merely theoretical notions. Even efficient markets do not guarantee desirable outcomes. This kind of outcome underscores the role of the distribution of wealth and of human capital as a fundamental determinant of poverty. The potential value of government intervention for market regulation and for purposes of income distribution is widely acknowledged.
Govemment policies in a variety of arenas clearly play important roles in mediating Me. Effects of population growth on educational enrollment and quality, on rates of exploitation of common property resources, on the development of social and economic infrastructure, on urbanization, and on research activities are all heavily dependent on existing government policies and their adaptiveness to changed conditions.
In short, the effects of rapid population growth are likely to be conditioned by the quality of markets, the nature of government policies, and features of the natural environment.
Since the effects are so dependent on these conditions, a reliable assessment of many of the net effects of population growth can best be carried out at the national level, although some issues concerning the environment and resources can only be analyzed globally.
It is of interest to briefly examine and contrast Me interplay between population grown and institutions in two important areas, China and tropical Africa. China, with its extremely low arable landlpopulation ratio, is often seen as greatly in need of population control policies in order to boost per capita agricultural income; this view is reflected in the government's severe disincentives for large families.
Although it is possible Mat the resultant decline in the population growth rate has somewhat increased per capita agricultural income, these gains are probably small compared with those from agricultural reforms instituted in Over the period , the real per capita income of Me rural population increased 15 percent annually, and total agricultural output increased 51 percent U.
Political independence and He forces of modernization came to tropical Africa later than to other areas. Although some countries in other regions also share these traits, markets are generally least well developed in tropical Africa, political factionalism is greatest, and human resource potential is least developed. In parts of Africa, sparseness of population itself may be responsible for some of these difficulties, but this explanation is implausible for such countries as Ethiopia or Kenya Obviously, slowing population growth is not a substitute for solving other problems, but it can reduce some of the more extreme manifestations of these problems while they are being solved.
However, He market-induced adjustments to higher. That these over devices exist does not imply a minimal role for population grown, but it does caution against advocacy of growth as the only way to achieve them. On balance, we reach the qualitative conclusion Cat slower population growth would be beneficial to economic development for most developing counties. A rigorous quantitative assessment of these benefits is difficult and context dependent.
Since we have stressed the role of slower population growth in raising per capita human and physical capital, it is instructive to use as a benchmark the effects of changes in the ratio of physical capital per person. Using a typical labor coefficient of 0. This would be a substantial gain, but by no means enough to vault a typical developing country into Be ranks of the developed. This simple calculation, however, does not fully reflect the complexity of Be linkages between population growth and economic development.
For instance, the production function would be expected to change in ways that reduce the advantages of slower population grown. We have reviewed considerable evidence, particularly in the agricultural sector, of how technology adapts to changes in factor proportions.
In most places it is reasonable to expect slower growth in the labor force to reduce the intensity of adaptive response in the form of land improvement, instigation, and agricultural research.
On the other hand, the calculation does not reflect increases in production due to the healthier and better educated work force Mat would result from lower fertility. None of these models embodies the more. Careful scientific research is needed both to beuer quantify and to further elucidate most of the relationships discussed in this book. Research is especially needed on urbanization and the consequences of urban growth; savings and the formation of physical capital; the effect of population grown on health, education, and the development of human capital; and the nature and extent of extemalities of childbearing.
Such research would be appropriately supported by mission-oriented development organizations as well as by basic research agencies. Whether the economic problems posed by population grown are large or small, and whether they are best approached by slowing the population grown rate, depends ultimately on the costs of alternative policy responses.
We now turn to outline those responses. A fundamental solution to these problems lies in better policies outside the population arena. However, some policies may be extremely resistant to correction, even over the medium to long term. Moreover, we have found some beneficial effects of slower population grown even in the presence of well-functioning markets and other institutions.
Thus, there appears to be a legitimate role for population policy, providing its benefits exceed its costs. Although educational and health policies may have indirect effects on fertility, family planning programs have been the most conventional and direct instrument of government population policy.
By family planning programs, we mean He provision of contraceptive services, together with information about contraception and child spacing. In most developing countries, family planning program expenditures represent less than 1 percent of the government budget. Government support for family planning programs can have an economic and social rationale quite apart from He effect of programs on rates of population growth. In such a situation, the supply of information and services will increase family welfare.
Govemments can often supply information and services about reproduction more efficiently and cheaply than Me private sector, in part because large and risky investments are required and because some of Me benefits to consumers cannot be captured by the suppliers. In particular, valuable information can flow from person to person without any financial reward to the initial supplier: information about the consequences of childbearing is one example; the rhythm method is another. In this case, the private sector will underinvest in the provision of such services.
The rationale for government support for family planning programs is similar to that for support of a variety of public health programs, as well as for agricultural research and extension services. Finally, family planning programs are likely to be of more value to lower income groups than to higher income groups, who may have beKer access to private services, so government support for these programs can help to advance equity goals If people use the services and information supplied by government family planning programs and if fertility falls as a result, an obvious case can be made that the program has increased the private welfare of users by reducing the cost of fertility control and by reducing the gap between desired and achieved fertility.
This gain in private well-being is added to whatever other gains accrue on the national agenda from fertility reduction.
Some parts of the world are now seeing smaller increments of growth, and some, such as Japan, Germany, and Spain, are actually experiencing population decreases. The continent of Africa, however, is not following this pattern. Now home to 1. In the past year the population of the African continent grew by 30 million. By the year , annual increases will exceed 42 million people per year and total population will have doubled to 2.
Either the Editor, the Editorial Board individually or collectively or the Development and Management Study Group DMSG assumes any responsibility for statements of facts or opinions in the papers published and are therefore absolved of any legal liability. The authors are in every way responsible for the contents of individual articles. Reproduction of any sort, including photocopying of this journal or portions of it, or any storage whatsoever, by any person s without prior permission of the copyright owners, is prohibited. AJOL and the millions of African and international researchers who rely on our free services are deeply grateful for your contribution. Your donation is guaranteed to directly contribute to Africans sharing their research output with a global readership. Skip to main content Skip to main navigation menu Skip to site footer. Abstract The apparent intractability of the problem posed by widespread poverty in Africa has made it an international issue.
The rate of population growth influences socio-economic development which in turn affects the process of demographic growth. However, there is no inevitable.
Africa Toward pp Cite as. The population issue is an overriding factor in addressing these questions. After placing discussions on population and development policies in the African context, the relationships between demographic growth and development in Africa are analysed by examining the specific case of North Africa and the impact of human capital improvement upon demographic changes. This treatment of the current state of the population-development relationship in Africa enables us to present the different domains where uncertainties prevail and draw up possible medium-term trajectories concerning demographic change and development.
Urbanization is transforming the world. According to the Drivers of Migration and Urbanization in Africa report by the United Nations, more than half of the global population now lives in urban areas. This figure is projected to increase to 75 percent by , at a growing rate of 65 million urban dwellers annually.
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In recent years an increasing number of African people are being added every year This was not always the cas these population increases are unprecedented in history. If development entails the improvement in people's level of living - their incomes, health, education and general well-being - and if it also encompasses their self esteem, respect dignity and freedom of choice then the really impotant question about population growth is how does the contemporary population situation in many African countries contribute to or detract from their chances of realizing the goals of development, not only for the current generation but also for the future generations? Conversely, how does development affect population growth? To extent does rapid population increase make it more difficult to provide essential social services including housing, transport, sanitation, and security? Will employment opportunities be plentiful or will it be a major achievement just to keep unemployment levels from rising? Will world food supply and its distributon be sufficient not only to meet the anticipated population increasein the coming decades but also to improve nutritional levels to the point where all humans can have an adequate diet? Is there a relationship between poverty and family size?
However, as an urban sociologist, the author will focus on the fifth development constraint and on the contrasting policies Tanzania and Kenya have devised in response to it. Even more relevant to the theme of this article, however, is the fact that by Tanzania had reached nearly the same level of urbanisation — 12 percent and 15 percent, respectively, as well as nearly the same concentration of urban population in their capital or primate cities—50 percent and 57 percent, respectively World Bank, Jo Huth, M. Report bugs here. Please share your general feedback. You can join in the discussion by joining the community or logging in here.
PIP: Despite great improvements over the past several years, the quality of demographic data in Africa is still a problem, and Africa remains the least well known continent. The natural increase rate even shows some signs of increasing slightly in the next decade or so. Africa's population was estimated at million in , million at present, and is projected at 1. The rapid population growth is the result of declining mortality since the s unmatched by changes in fertility. There are significant socioeconomic and rural-urban mortality differentials in Africa, but as yet only highly educated urbanites have measurably reduced their family size. By , 18 countries will have densities of over persons per sq km. As a rule, women marry young and remain married until the end of their reproductive years.
Я звоню Джаббе. Когда он попытался обойти Стратмора, тот преградил ему дорогу. Лестничная площадка, на которой они стояли, была совсем крохотной. Они сцепились. Перила были невысокими. Как это странно, подумал Стратмор, что насчет вируса Чатрукьян был прав с самого начала.
Три. Она перевела взгляд на пустую шифровалку. Скорее бы просигналил ее терминал. Но тот молчал. Конец лета. Солнце уже зашло. Над головой автоматически зажглись лампы дневного света.
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