evil inside human violence and cruelty pdf

Evil inside human violence and cruelty pdf

File Name: evil inside human violence and cruelty .zip
Size: 23662Kb
Published: 13.04.2021

Introduction

Read Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty PDF Free

The Evil within - A motif analysis on Shakespeare´s 'Macbeth'

Introduction

I describe the perception of evil as a categorization judgment, based on a prototype, with extensive feedback loops and top-down influences. Based on the attachment approach to moral judgment Govrin, , , I suggest that the perception of evil consists of four salient features: Extreme asymmetry between victim and perpetrator; a specific perceived attitude of the perpetrator toward the victim's vulnerability; the observer's inability to understand the perpetrator's perspective; and insuperable differences between the observer and perpetrator's judgment following the incident which shake the observer no less than the event itself.

I then show that the perception of evil involves a cognitive bias: The observer is almost always mistaken in his attributions of a certain state of mind to the perpetrator.

The philosophical and evolutionary significance of this bias is discussed as well as suggestions for future testing of the prototype model of evil. Over a period of thousands of years, the concept of evil was closely linked to a religious view of life.

In Judaism and Christianity evil is viewed as human conduct in defiance of God's Commandments. An act of evil violates that holy code. However, despite the evident religious connotations attached to the concept of evil, widespread usage of the term has survived.

People in Western societies employ the term in a variety of contexts. The holocaust has become the ultimate paradigm of evil Gampel, , p. However, the term is also used to describe war crimes, horrific acts of murder, cruel violence, sexual abuse and attempts to cause suffering simply to gain pleasure from a victim's acute distress. One must assume that the concept has survived because people find it useful.

Perhaps it describes a category of moral failures of a certain kind better than any other concept does. And yet, even though the term is quite common, psychologists have avoided using empirical methods to deal with the subject of evil. In the professional discourse, evil has been consistently viewed at best as an elusive topic and, at worst, a dangerous one and thus should not be, nor need it be, turned into a scientifically researched field of enquiry Govrin, This paper deals with the following question: What is it that glues together disparate acts of evil?

In other words: Can we point to certain characteristics which are common to all instances of perceived evil? And if so can we say, as I shall argue that we can, that this commonality constitutes a prototype of evil? The two people concerned can agree on what the common features of all instances of evil are, even if they disagree about the existence or otherwise of these characteristics in a given moral situation. Therefore, cultural differences in relation to moral values do not necessarily cancel out the agreement that exists between people in relation to the perception of evil.

There are three parts to this paper. In part one, I show that it makes a great deal of sense to perceive evil as a coherent concept incorporating a number of salient features which, combined, create a prototype of evil.

In part two, I rely on the attachment approach to moral psychology Govrin, , to show that four co-occurring features generate the most salient features of the prototype of evil: Extreme asymmetry between victim and perpetrator; a specific perceived attitude of the perpetrator toward the victim's vulnerability Govrin, ; the observer's inability to recognize or identify with the perpetrator's motivation; and insuperable differences between the observer's and perpetrator's judgment following the incident.

In the third part, I describe the perception of evil as a cognitive bias, an inherent gap between the attribution of the observer and the actual experience of the perpetrator. The philosophical and cultural significance of this gap is discussed in the final part of the paper. My objective is to inspire a greater interest among psychologists in the concept of evil, to view it as an important subject for scientific research and to stimulate an understanding of this phenomenon from a variety of perspectives.

As a consequence of the paucity of research on this topic in the field of moral psychology I draw on evidence outside of that domain including evidence provided by historical events. Therefore, the model I am suggesting can only be regard as a possible explanation of what constitutes an act of evil and not as an established fact. Elsewhere I explained why philosophers had, and continue to have, a tough time defining evil Govrin, Definitions of evil are plagued by three problems. Secondly, many of the philosophical definitions of evil are quantitative in the sense that they distinguish evil merely in terms of excessive wrongdoing.

Luke Russell , maintains that no philosopher has been able to creditably depict an act of evil that is qualitatively distinguishable from commonly encountered acts of wrongdoing. The difficulty with formulating a definition of evil is that most definitions rely on classical philosophical structures. The definitions I have cited try to isolate and apply an appropriate law or rule.

They attempt to locate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that would effectively define evil. Such theoretical accounts, they explain, view the mind as if it were a highly skillful machine able to effortlessly calculate acts of evil. The calculation is made by subjecting a given situation to a series of simple tests with an example being classified as evil only if it passes all the tests in turn.

Let us suppose that in order for an act to be classified as evil it must be massively damaging, intentional, and absent of any expression of remorse by the perpetrator. Since then contemporary research has shown that in reality mental processes are far more complex Dreyfus, , The if-then model represents a classical structure by which an appropriate law or rule is isolated.

The trouble is that most human concepts do not possess a classical structure. This doctrine, he claims, permeates our cultural heritage and hence underpins both lay and philosophical conceptions of moral life. Yet it is a doctrine that, he argues, is radically mistaken and morally incorrect. According to Johnson it would be ethically reckless for us to believe and behave as if we had within us a universal, ethereal faculty for reasoning which is capable of generating universally accepted laws and procedures 5.

Recent views of the operation of the mind support this more disorderly and more dynamic view of how judgments are formed. In work carried out by Spivey and Dale , perception and cognition have been shown to involve continuous processes of competition, rather than successive computations. Examples showing this to be so are drawn from extensive research in visual cognition.

A better account to define moral judgment is through a class of computational approaches known as connectionism. According to this view, we do not simply test for the presence or absence of a neat list of defining features and judge the concept applicable or inapplicable accordingly. One of the more fruitful models of this approach is theory offered by Churchland , p. According to Churchland's moral network theory Churchland, our moral knowledge is developed in a process similar to that by which we develop specific physical skills, by training the response of neuronal networks to sensory input.

Such training enables us to understand and adapt to the social world in which we live. Unlike Churchland , Clark , p. Instead, Clark suggests that the critical factor involved is the statistical median of a group of exemplars.

Such a measure is computed by viewing each specific exemplar as consisting of several features that regularly appear together leading to the formation of a kind of artificial model which links the characteristics that are statistically the most significant. Thus, the archetypal pet may possess both dog and pet features, and the archetypical crime may include personal injury and loss of property. As a result, the system will become especially adept at encoding and responding to such features.

Feature that commonly occur together in the exemplars become strongly mutually associated. Such a concept of prototype corresponds with a model of information storage in the brain called state-space representation, which draws on neuroscience Churchland, ; Clark, Churchland posits that the brain's representation of color, for example, is perceived as involving a three dimensional 3D state space in which the dimensions reveal a long-wave reflectance, b medium-wave reflectance and c short-wave reflectance.

According to Churchland, each such dimension may correspond to the action of three distinct types of retinal cone.

Within such a 3D space white and black reside in diametrically opposed locations, while red and orange are quite close together. Our perceptions regarding the perceived similarity-difference relations between colors may thus be understood as mirroring distance in this color-state space. According to Churchland, new instances are rather categorized as basically falling under a concept or category according to the perceived distance of the instance from a prototypical example.

Churchland's theory has been criticized by Larson on the grounds that it fails to identify which features of moral prototypes are crucial for categorization.

Such a lie is clearly in a different category than lies that are morally wrong. Instead of thinking that perceivers of evil apply a rule-based context-free moral vision we must find what kind of fast, highly focused, context related information perceivers are considering when judging whether a moral failure is evil or just an act of severe wrongdoing.

Although the categories of moral failure and evil overlap, evil tends to have greater weight and emotional response. The tendency of philosophers to look for defining features should be replaced then by an inclination toward human moral psychology.

In this paper, I wish to base the perception of evil on a prototype model. I suggest that evil is no exception. Burris and Rempel , were the first to explore evil as a prototype. They initially asked approximately students to list whatever came to mind when they thought of evil. Students' responses were coded into possible meaningful categories. Evil is perceived as applicable to events involving intentional harm, is associated with negative emotional reaction and with religious Satan, Adam and Eve and secular symbols money, black.

People apply the label evil whenever enough of these central features of the evil prototype are salient in a given situation. In my view, the traits singled out by this research are necessary but insufficient. Firstly, Gromet et al. Severe negligence resulting in death or injury can also be judged as lacking justification but is not considered evil. Also, the perpetrator will have many justifications, considered by him to be valid, for having harmed the victim.

Why, in so many cases, does the observer refuse to accept the perpetrator's explanations? Perceived lack of justification is too narrow a characterization to describe the huge cognitive discrepancy and emotional crisis between the observer and the perpetrator. Thirdly, these characterizations do not consider the power relations between the two sides and the specific traits of each one of them.

An incident in which an individual suffering from a psychiatric disorder shoots someone. Each of these cases is characterized by intentionality, harm, and lack of justification. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the observer will not classify these behaviors in the same way since in each case the relations between the two parties differ. The proposition advanced in this paper is that in every moral judgment reached the observer must assess relations between two sides.

The parameters relating to evil and every moral judgment cannot in and of themselves supply us with an all-inclusive list of the traits relevant to acts of evil and the perpetrator's motives unless they are combined with a theory explaining how the observer assess the relationship between two people. The central argument I develop is that the perception of evil must be understood thorough acquaintance with the nature of moral judgment. Elsewhere I argued that evil is not only defined by the intention of the aggressor and his wickedness, or the magnitude of the harm caused.

Each of these in isolation cannot serve our purpose. Rather, we need to find the perceptual properties that guide us in recognizing and discriminating evil from ordinary wrongdoing.

Like the perception of color and sounds, this is not something we are necessarily aware of and here too we might find as in other cognitive faculties the priority of the preverbal over the verbal.

The perception model of evil presented here is a particular case within a general theory of moral judgment—the attachment approach to moral judgment Govrin, , According to this theory, the core of most moral judgments is an observer evaluating a dyad. Thus, within a basic moral judgment situation three sides are involved: two conflicting parties a dyad and an observer.

This theory emerges from a modest tradition of research according to which the foundation of morality is linked to our evolution as mammals that possess a system of attachment and an ability to feel and respond to the pain of others Bowlby, ; Churchland, ; Haidt, According to this theory, common to all moral situations is a universal deep structure which infants learn to identify rapidly and effortlessly in their first year of life.

The deep structure behind every moral situation is a dyadic structure Gray et al.

Read Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty PDF Free

W hy is there evil, and what can scientific research tell us about the origins and persistence of evil behavior? Considering evil from the unusual perspective of the perpetrator, Roy Baumeister asks, How do ordinary people find themselves beating their wives? Murdering rival gang members? Torturing political prisoners? Betraying their colleagues to the secret police? Why do cycles of revenge so often escalate? Roy casts new light on these issues as he examines the gap between the victim's viewpoint and that of the perpetrator, and also the roots of evil behavior, from egotism and revenge to idealism and sadism.

DOB from Wikipedia. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Other editions. Enlarge cover.

Baumeister, R. Evil: inside human cruelty and violence. New York: W. Baumeister, Roy F. Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence. Freeman,

The Evil within - A motif analysis on Shakespeare´s 'Macbeth'

The Evil: 2. The Evil in Etymological and Semantical Perspective: 2. The Faces of the Evil or the Unseizable Horror: 2. The Other versus the I:.

Inside Human Violence and Cruelty Evil

I describe the perception of evil as a categorization judgment, based on a prototype, with extensive feedback loops and top-down influences. Based on the attachment approach to moral judgment Govrin, , , I suggest that the perception of evil consists of four salient features: Extreme asymmetry between victim and perpetrator; a specific perceived attitude of the perpetrator toward the victim's vulnerability; the observer's inability to understand the perpetrator's perspective; and insuperable differences between the observer and perpetrator's judgment following the incident which shake the observer no less than the event itself.

Featured channels

DOB from Wikipedia. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Other editions. Enlarge cover.

Quality material: made from latex, Lateral side goring with a medial side zipper provides a comfortable wear and an easy on-and-off, UNIQUE DESIGNS AND GRAPHICS: We put a lot of thought and time in our design process, bleach and perfumes can cause sterling silver to discolor very quickly and can damage your jewelry, These are the sample pictures of the best quality, - Photo props displayed in the preview is for example viewing only, Mary Catherine began painting at an early age; receiving watercolor lessons at age 4 from her grandmother and New Orleans artist. We professional commitment to design, If you would like a custom size please specify when you order, Blue Wisteria Vines drape across this Porcelain Teapot with a shimmery Blue Bird on the lid. The Drove Roads of Scotland. Sierra International Marine Washer. Understanding Reptile Parasites.

DOB from Wikipedia. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Other editions. Enlarge cover.

4 comments

  • ThГ©odore B. 15.04.2021 at 07:35

    PDF | On Mar 1, , Leigh W. Jerome and others published Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty | Find, read and cite all the research you.

    Reply
  • Cibeles A. 18.04.2021 at 04:21

    Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty [Baumeister Ph.D., Roy F., Beck, Aaron] on rnasystemsbiology.org *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Evil: Inside Human.

    Reply
  • Brigitte F. 18.04.2021 at 07:39

    Teaching students with special needs in general education classrooms 8th edition pdf pankaj jalote software project management in practice pearson 2002 pdf

    Reply
  • Pampa P. 19.04.2021 at 03:00

    Roy F.

    Reply

Leave a reply