File Name: intuition and philosophy of science .zip
This entry addresses the nature and epistemological role of intuition by considering the following questions: 1 What are intuitions? Consider the claim that a fully rational person does not believe both p and not- p. Very likely, as you considered it, that claim seemed true to you. Something similar probably happens when you consider the following propositions:. The focus of this entry is intuitions—mental states or events in which a proposition seems true in the manner of these propositions. Some psychological research seems similarly permissive. Such research has shown that agents with sufficient experience in a given domain e.
Heck, even most philosophers — who historically had been very happy to talk about consciousness , far ahead of the rise of neurobiology — found themselves with not much to say about intuition. It was William James, the father of modern psychology, who first proposed the idea that cognition takes place in two different modes, and his insight anticipated modern so-called dual theories of cognition. Rational thinking, on the contrary, is analytical, requires effort, and is slow. Think of it this way: intuitions, contrary to much popular lore, are not infallible. Cognitive scientists treat them as quick first assessments of a given situation, as provisional hypotheses in need of further checking. One of the first things that modern research on intuition has clearly shown is that there is no such thing as an intuitive person tout court.
Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I present some of the more famous work in cognitive science that has marshaled this concern. Then I present reasons to think that those with training in philosophy will be less prone to certain systematic errors in reasoning. The suggestion is that if philosophers could be shown to be less prone to such errors, then the worries about the integrity of philosophy could be constrained.
In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories.
It seems that you're in Germany. We have a dedicated site for Germany. This book focuses on the role of intuition in querying Socratic problems, the very nature of intuition itself, and whether it can be legitimately used to support or reject philosophical theses. The reader is introduced to questions connected to the use of intuition in philosophy through an analysis of two methods where the appeal to intuition is explicit: thought experiments and reflective equilibrium. In addition, the debate on the legitimacy of such an appeal is presented as connected to the discussion on the nature of the aims and results of philosophical inquiries. Finally, the main tenets and results of experimental philosophers are discussed, highlighting the methodological limits of such studies. Readers interested in the nature of intuition in philosophy will find this an invaluable and revealing resource.
Experimental philosophy is an emerging field of philosophical inquiry      that makes use of empirical data—often gathered through surveys which probe the intuitions of ordinary people—in order to inform research on philosophical questions. Disagreement about what experimental philosophy can accomplish is widespread. One claim is that the empirical data gathered by experimental philosophers can have an indirect effect on philosophical questions by allowing for a better understanding of the underlying psychological processes which lead to philosophical intuitions. Though, in early modern philosophy, natural philosophy was sometimes referred to as "experimental philosophy",  the field associated with the current sense of the term dates its origins around when a small number of students experimented with the idea of fusing philosophy to the experimental rigor of psychology. While the philosophical movement Experimental Philosophy began around though perhaps the earliest example of the approach is reported by Hewson,  , the use of empirical methods in philosophy far predates the emergence of the recent academic field.
PDF | On Jul 10, , Darrell P. Rowbottom published Intuitions in Science debates in philosophy of science, in so far as (often relatively.
This paper addresses the definition and the operational use of intuitions in philosophical methods in the form of a research study encompassing several regions of the globe, involving philosophers from a wide array of academic backgrounds and areas of specialisation. The authors tested whether philosophers agree on the conceptual definition and the operational use of intuitions, and investigated whether specific demographic variables and philosophical specialisation influence how philosophers define and use intuitions. The results obtained point to a number of significant findings, including that philosophers distinguish between intuitions used to formulate discovery and to test justification philosophical theory.